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Abstract 
 
Higher education systems featuring intense competition have developed world-class 
universities, capable of attracting top professors and students and considerable public-
private funding. This does not occur in non-competitive systems, where highly-talented 
faculty and students are dispersed across all institutions. In such systems, the authors 
propose the budding of spin-off universities, staffed by migration of top scientists from 
the entire public research system. This work illustrate the proposal through an example: 
the spin-off of a new university in Rome-Italy staffed with the best professors from the 
three current public city universities. Such a faculty would offer top national research 
productivity, a magnet to attract the other critical ingredients of a world-class 
university: talented students, abundant resources and visionary governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, higher education systems throughout the world have experienced 
strong expansion in both demand and offer. There are constant increases in the number 
of subjects operating in the global system, in their geographic distribution, and in the 
extent of diversification at the level of disciplinary specialization (Teixeira et al., 2011). 
These changes respond to the growing “massification” of higher education (Rossi, 
2010) but also result from interventions by policy makers to reinforce competitive 
market-like mechanisms and thus achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency 
(Jongbloed, 2004). The processes of globalization impact on higher education just as 
much as on the other sectors. For some years, world-class universities that have 
traditionally attracted highly talented foreign faculty, students and financing have also 
internationalized their activity by opening satellite campuses in other nations. Given the 
current knowledge-based economy, governments are more often making decided efforts 
to improve the average quality of their higher education systems and to stimulate the 
growth of elite universities. The European Union considers the contribution of higher 
education as central in giving the region “the most competitive economy and 
knowledge-based society of the 21st century”. There is awareness that the European 
higher education system is still too fragmentary and hampered by a combination of 
excessive public control and scarce autonomy. This has led many national governments 
to begin reforms aimed at releasing the full potential of their domestic universities. In 
this context, the particular social and economic benefits of elite universities to the 
nation and their home regions have been soundly demonstrated (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 
2007; Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Jaffe, 1989). While 
non-elite universities also play a substantial role in fostering national and regional 
development, the impact of elite universities is unquestionable, even though the extent 
of their influence depends in part on the characteristics of the national and regional 
economic systems and normative environments. 
The aim of the current work is to contribute to a more evidence-based reform 
process by providing empirical simulation of the creation of elite2 universities in non-
competitive and undifferentiated higher education systems. 
The first step in designing policies to foster elite universities is to define what they 
have that others lack and to identify the catalysts for the development of such 
characteristics. Several scholars have identified the distinctive features of elite 
universities, indicating the presence of highly qualified faculty, talented students, 
abundant resources, autonomy, and favorable governance (Niland, 2007; Altbach, 
2004). The growth of elite universities is favored by regulatory environments that 
introduce and permit competitive mechanisms for the stimulation of continuous 
improvement and the pursuit of competitive advantage. Aghion et al. (2009) show that 
universities’ performance is correlated with their autonomy and competitive 
environment. The level of competitiveness depends on cultural and other contextual 
factors, particularly the level of university autonomy, the type of financing and a 
government regulatory framework that is supportive in character. In competitive higher 
education systems, such as those observed in English speaking nations, the pursuit of 
competitive advantage has led to development of world-class universities that can 
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attract, develop and retain highly-talented national and foreign faculty and students. The 
same institutions also obtain abundant public financing, private financing and 
donations, and attract venture capital and establishments of national and international 
enterprise in their territory, with resulting social and economic benefits. The 
competition factor has generated universities that are distinct in their quality of 
education and research, and thus in prestige, and that offer degrees and produce research 
results that also stand out for their social and market value. However, in nations where 
the state has a significant presence in the regulation and direct financing of universities 
(Auranen and Nieminen, 2010) and where competitive aspects of higher education are 
scarce or absent, we observe the contrary: here we see little differentiation among 
universities and an absence of elite institutions. While we accept the limits of 
international comparisons (Abramo et al., 2011a; Turner, 2005), it is no accident that 
the 2011 SJTU Academic Ranking of World Universities3, lists the entire top 20 
institutions as being U.S. (with 17) or U.K. (three), while the THES 2011-2012 World 
Academic Ranking4 includes only one Swiss and one Canadian university among the 
top 20, which are otherwise again all from the U.K. and the U.S. 
Without doubt, higher education is continually assuming the character of a global 
market with local impact, where competition among universities is ever more 
international. Countries without elite universities inevitably undergo brain drain of 
highly talented faculty and students towards nations with world-class institutions. There 
is also a drain of financial resources, as private companies prefer to finance research 
projects in foreign world-class universities rather than domestic ones. If “have not” 
countries wish to gain prominent institutions that compete at the global level, then the 
role of the state becomes fundamental. In the past, such universities as Oxford, 
Cambridge or the U.S. Ivy League would grow to prominence as a result of incremental 
progress, rather than by deliberate government intervention. It is impossible to think of 
rapidly creating elite universities at the present moment, without direct intervention and 
support from the state (Salmi, 2009). Through survey and analysis of modern 
international experience, three possible strategies have been identified (Salmi, 2009): i) 
focus resources on a restricted number of existing universities with the greatest potential 
(a strategy recently adopted by the French government and highly recognizable in the 
“German Initiative for Excellence”); ii) encourage mergers of a number of existing 
universities to realize the necessary synergies for becoming world-class universities (the 
governments of Denmark, China and Russia have policy to reward the merger of similar 
institutions; Cardiff University and the South Wales School of Medicine have 
deliberately merged as a step towards a world-class university in Wales); iii) create new 
world-class universities from a fresh start (examples are mainly seen in emerging 
countries such as India, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, but also in Europe, as in the Paris 
School of Economics). 
The authors, stimulated by the availability of sophisticated bibliometric instruments 
and by their extensive observation of the Italian higher education system, which has 
very little differentiation and definitely lacks elite universities of meaningful size, 
suggest a fourth strategy: to bud spin-off universities from existing ones, through the 
extraction of top professors from the parent universities. A highly talented faculty is not 
alone sufficient to create an elite university, but in our opinion it is the single most 
important factor, and can catalyze attraction of all the other determinants (talented 
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students, abundant resources, appropriate governance). Government must still play an 
essential role, in establishing a favorable regulatory environment and supporting the 
internationalization and global competitiveness of spin-off universities during the start-
up phase. 
While we propose “budding” as a strategy for international consideration, the 
characteristics of the Italian academic system permit a ready test of its feasibility. This 
is a system where universities have only recently achieved certain management 
autonomy, but where there are still tight restrictions and excessive central regulation, 
particularly affecting recruitment, salaries and awarding of degrees. 
In this work we simulate the budding of a spin-off university from those already 
present in Rome, in order to avoid any obligation that professors move geographically, 
which could be a social deterrent that would inhibit creation of the new elite university. 
The procedures could be repeated for other areas of Italy, with the objective of spinning 
off a fairly homogenous national distribution of elite institutions, always beginning 
from existing universities. In our simulation the new Rome Spin-off University (RSU) 
would consist of five schools: mathematics, physics, chemistry, earth science and 
engineering. Of the 15 universities in Rome, only the three largest ones offer 
undergraduate degrees in these disciplines: the University of Rome “Sapienza”, 
University of Rome “Tor Vergata” and University of Rome “Tre”5. According to the 
size of the teaching staff, these institutions rank as largest, 11th and 25th out of the 95 
Italian universities. The spin-off professors are extracted from the three parent 
universities on the basis of scientific merit6. This is assessed with bibliometric 
techniques, thoroughly described and tested in literature that measure the research 
productivity of each professor and provide comparisons to all national colleagues of the 
same research field and academic rank (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2011). 
In Sections 2 and 3 of this paper we summarize the characteristics of the Italian 
higher education system and illustrate the specific techniques for the dimensioning of 
the new RSU. In Section 4 we present the methodological approach for identifying the 
RSU professors and show the faculty composition. Section 5 presents statistics 
describing the distribution of individual performance by the selected professors 
compared to their national colleagues, and the performance of the overall RSU, at the 
level of fields and disciplines. The work concludes with a summary of the proposal and 
the authors comments on policy implications and implementation. 
 
 
2. The Italian higher education system 
 
The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) officially 
recognizes a total of 95 universities, giving them authority to issue legally-recognized 
degrees. Twenty-eight of these are very small private special-focus universities, of 
which 12 offer only e-learning. Sixty-seven are public and generally multi-disciplinary 
universities, scattered throughout the nation, some having a number of branches in 
smaller towns. Six institutions are Scuole Superiori (Schools for Advanced Studies), 
specifically devoted to highly talented students, with very small faculties and tightly 
limited enrollment numbers per degree program. In Italy, 94.9% of faculty are 
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employed in public universities (0.5% in Scuole Superiori) and 5.1% are in private 
universities. 
The Italian higher education system is a long-standing classic example of a public 
and highly centralized governance structure, with low levels of autonomy at the 
university level and a very strong role played by the central state. Until 2008, core 
government funding was input oriented, and distributed to satisfy the resource needs of 
each and every university in function of their size and activities. It has only been since 
2009, following the first national research assessment exercise (VTR), that a minimal 
share of MIUR financing has been allocated based on research and teaching quality: this 
share represents 3.9% of total university income. 
In keeping with the German “Humboldt” model, all university professors are 
contractually obligated to carry out research, thus there are no teaching-only institutions 
in Italy. National regulations establish that each faculty member must allocate a 
minimum of 350 hours per year to teaching. At the end of 2010, there were 58,000 
faculty members in Italy (full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal 
number of technical-administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system 
through public examinations and career advancement can only proceed by further public 
examinations. Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according 
to role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: 
assistant, associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends 
on merit: salaries increase annually according to rules set by government. Moreover, as 
it is throughout the Italian public administration, dismissal of an employee for lack of 
productivity is unheard of. 
The whole of these conditions create an environment and a culture that are 
completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated according to quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole 
Superiori and a very small number of the private special-focus universities. The system 
is thus unable to attract significant foreign faculty or students. The numbers are 
negligible: foreign students are 3% of the total, compared to the OECD average of 
8.5%, and only 2.3% of actual graduates are foreigners; only 1.8% of faculty are foreign 
nationals. This is a system where every university has some share of top professors, 
flanked by another share of absolute non-producers, an observation confirmed by 
empirical evaluation of the scientific performance of universities and individual faculty 
members (Abramo et al., 2011b). Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 (16.8%) of the 
39,512 hard sciences professors did not publish any scientific articles in the journals 
censused by the Thomson-Reuters Web of Science (WoS). Another 3,070 professors 
(7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work was never cited. This means that 9,710 
individuals (24.6%) had no impact on scientific progress. An almost equal 23% of 
professors alone produced 77% of the overall scientific advancement (Abramo et al., 
2011b). The problem is that most productive faculty are not concentrated in a limited 
number of universities, but is instead dispersed more or less uniformly among all Italian 
universities, along with the unproductive individuals, so that no single institution 
reaches the critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an elite university and 
compete at the international level. Abramo et al. (2012a) show empirical evidence that 
research performance across Italian universities has a more or less similar pattern of 
distribution. The authors found that the performance distribution within universities is 
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generally highly concentrated on certain individuals, similar to the pattern of the entire 
research population. They also found that the variability of average performance among 
universities is below that for the subpopulation of individuals within each university. 
The Italian government has granted universities very much greater autonomy, but 
has done very little to create disciplined competition for research funding, faculty, and 
students. Autonomy and competition together would have important synergistic effects, 
but one of these alone can be very dangerous. There is a widely-shared opinion that 
institutional evaluation with subsequent selective allocation of funding could resolve a 
good part of the obvious inefficiencies, but the authors remain skeptical. In cases such 
as Italy’s, where accompanying salary schemes based on merit are missing and where 
the share of resource allocation based on institutional merit is very small, it is doubtful 
that such a system would lead to significant increments in production efficiency, or 
displace historic practices of favoritism and give way to efficient selection processes. 
Given this, it is still more difficult to believe that we will see the development of elite 
universities, even over the long term. Given the knowledge-based economy and the 
urgency of global competitive challenges, the authors suggest a more daring policy: the 
budding of spin-off universities staffed by migration from only the top scientists of the 
national research system, possibly with the new institutions located in a balanced 
regional manner. With very low investment, it would be possible to quickly create the 
type of elite universities that other competitive systems have produced over decades of 
time: universities capable of attracting the best faculty and students and public and 
private capital, and of providing much greater economic benefit than the present 
universities, with their high dispersion of internal performance. 
 
 
3. Determining the size of Rome Spin-off University 
 
The three largest universities in Rome are generalist in character. Although they 
show some diversification, all three are active in the hard sciences, social sciences and 
humanities. The oldest and largest of the three universities, Rome “Sapienza”, is 
situated in the city center and has a faculty of over 4000. The two newer institutions are 
the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, founded in 1982 and University of Rome “Tre”, 
founded in 1992, both based further from the city center and both established in order to 
relieve crowding at the Sapienza, which had reached the limits of governability and was 
no longer capable of meeting the increasing demand for education. 
In the Italian university system each professor is classified in one and only one 
research field. There are a total of 370 such fields (named scientific disciplinary sectors, 
or SDSs7), grouped into 14 disciplines (named university disciplinary areas, or UDAs). 
The dimension and scope of the research fields that we propose for the RSU depend, on 
the one hand, on the choice to use bibliometrics as a starting point for preparing the 
empirical simulation, and, on the other hand, on the choice of parent institutions. 
Bibliometric methodology is applicable only to the hard sciences and restricts our 
proposal for the RSU faculty only to those specializations. The faculty size and field 
specialization of the RSU are based on those of Rome Tre, the smallest of the three 
generalist institutions, thus guaranteeing true feasibility in implementing the RSU. For 
the same purpose, we also try as much as possible to reproduce the distribution of fields, 
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January 21, 2013. 
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disciplines and academic ranks of Rome “Tre”. This is possible for four of the five RSU 
schools: mathematics, physics, earth sciences and engineering. Rome “Tre” currently 
does not have a separate department of chemistry so we take the faculty of the 
department of chemistry of Rome “Sapienza” and rescale its size according to the 
faculty ratio of the two institutions for the other considered UDAs 8. The RSU should 
thus have 247 professors, with distribution per SDS and UDA as presented in Table 1. 
The sizing criteria should permit the RSU to establish at least eight degree programs: 
Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Earth sciences, Civil engineering, Mechanical 
engineering, Electronics engineering and Computer science. 
The RSU would be medium-sized for overall numbers of faculty, placing 46th out of 
the total 90 Italian universities. We could “enlarge” the empirical simulation by 
broadening the range of parent institutions to universities in other regions or to other 
public research organizations, thus permitting an increase in the number of faculty and 
range of disciplines. The adoption of peer-review methodology (difficult to simulate for 
the current purposes) would also permit the inclusion of the social sciences, arts and 
humanities. However neither the size of faculty nor the scope of research fields would 
affect the key issue of research productivity since there are no returns to size (Abramo 
et al., 2012b; Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2005) and also no returns to scope (Abramo et al., 
2012c). 
 
[Table 1] 
 
 
4. Selecting RSU faculty 
 
The basic idea of the model is that, beginning from the three generalist Rome 
universities, the RSU will draw the professors with the best scientific performance in 
the 64 SDSs indicated in Table 1. Since the university has a special focus on the hard 
sciences, the literature gives ample indication (Moed, 2005; Glänzel and Debackere, 
2003) that it is legitimate to use bibliometric techniques to measure scientific 
performance. In the next section we give the details of the selection of RSU faculty. 
 
 
4.1 Methodology and dataset 
 
To assess scientific productivity of individual researchers we consider the outcome, 
or impact of their research activities, over the five year period from 2004 to 2008. As 
proxy of outcome we adopt the number of citations for the researcher’s publications at 
30/06/2009. Because the intensity of publications varies by field, we compare 
researchers within the same field, meaning the same SDS (Abramo and D’Angelo, 
2011). When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production 
                                                          
8 Including other disciplines, such as medicine, in the RSU would have restricted the selection of the top-
scientists for these fields to only two “parent” universities, which would have jeopardized the aim of the 
simulation, i.e. the realization of a university reaching elite status in all disciplines. For the same reason 
we have limited the RSU size to that of Rome “Tre” thus ensuring that, like the smallest of its parent 
universities, it would be capable of providing at least the same number of bachelor and masters 
programmes in all disciplines. We note that by expanding the range of parent universities beyond Rome, 
it would be possible to simulate the development of larger and more generalist spin-off universities. 
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factors available to each scientist then there should productivity should be normalized 
according to them. Unfortunately relevant data are not available in Italy. Another issue 
is that it is very possible that researchers belonging to a particular scientific field will 
also publish outside that field. Because citation behavior varies by field, we standardize 
the citations for each publication with respect to the median9 of the distribution of 
citations for all the Italian cited-only publications of the same year and the same WoS 
subject category10. Furthermore, research projects frequently involve a team of 
researchers, which shows in co-authorship of publications. In this case we account for 
the fractional contributions of scientists to outputs, as the reciprocal of number of co-
authors. The productivity of a single researcher (PR)
11, is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑅 = ∑
ci
mi
∗
1
si
n
i=1  [1] 
Where: 
ci = citations received by publication i; 
mi = median of the distribution of citations received for all Italian cited-only 
publications of the same year and subject category of publication i; 
si = co-authors of publication i 
n = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation. 
Data on faculty of each university and their SDS classification is extracted from the 
database on Italian university personnel, maintained by the MIUR12. The bibliometric 
dataset used to measure PR is extracted from the Italian Observatory of Public Research 
(ORP)13, a database developed and maintained by the authors and derived under license 
from the Thomson Reuters WoS. Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and 
applying a complex algorithm for reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and 
disambiguation of the true identity of the authors, each publication (article, article 
review and conference proceeding) is attributed to the university scientist or scientists 
that produced it (D’Angelo et al., 2010). We then elaborate PR ranking lists for each 
SDS, for the publication window 2004-2008. For each SDS, we then extract the names 
of the best professors active in each of the three parent Rome universities from the 
rankings lists, in numbers as indicated in Table 1. The next section shows the results of 
this extraction. 
 
 
4.2 Composition of the RSU faculty 
 
Of the 247 professors selected, 87 (35.2% of total) are full professors, 88 (35.6%) 
                                                          
9 As frequently observed in literature (Lundberg, 2007), standardization of citations with respect to 
median value rather than to the average is justified by the fact that distribution of citations is highly 
skewed in almost all disciplines. 
10 The subject category of a publication corresponds to that of the journal where it is published. For 
publications in multidisciplinary journals the standardized value is calculated as the average of 
standardized values for each subject category. 
11 This indicator is similar to the “crown indicator” of Leiden’s CWTS (Moed et al., 1985) and the “total 
field normalized citation score” of the Karolinska Institute (Rehn et al., 2007). The differences are: i) we 
standardize citations of single publications and not of scientific portfolio of researchers; ii) we standardize 
by the Italian median rather than the world average. We also consider fractional counting of citations 
based on co-authorship. 
12 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php. Last accessed on January 21, 2013. 
13 www.orp.researchvalue.it. Last accessed on January 21, 2013. 
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are associates and 72 (29.1%) are assistants. We check this balance among the three 
academic ranks to guarantee that it would permit the new organization to meet both 
research and teaching needs. To do this we compare the distribution per academic rank 
of the RSU faculty against the average national distribution (last line, Table 2), and 
observe that the differences are acceptable. The greatest variation (-3.8%), for assistant 
professors, is not enough to cause any particular worries. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
At the level of single UDAs, such variations clearly tend to differ, and in some cases 
could seem problematic: in physics, assistant professors are less than 20% of total 
faculty (8 out of 42); in mathematics they are 22% (6 of 27). However, if we analyze the 
same type of data for other individual Italian universities, we discover that such 
“unbalance” is not rare. For example, the International School for Advanced Studies in 
Trieste, which is one of the six Scuole Superiori, shows exactly the same type of 
distribution (46% full, 35% associate and 19% assistant professors). Thus in terms of 
the mix of academic ranks, the extraction process seems to have provided the RSU with 
a faculty composition that is appropriate for its institutional aims. 
In terms of the contribution from the three parent Rome universities, 55% of the 
total RSU faculty comes from Sapienza, 26% from Tor Vergata and 19% from Tre. 
These results are shown Table 3, including the distribution per UDA. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
At the macro level, the data seem coherent with sizes of the parent universities. 
However an analysis of concentration by UDA offers an interesting view of the real 
contribution of faculty from each of the three parent universities to the form of the new 
RSU. Table 4 presents the analysis by UDA. The concentration index shown in 
parentheses14 indicates that Physics is dominated by the professors originating from the 
Sapienza and Rome Tre. Rome Tre also contributes very significantly to the 
development of RSU faculty in Mathematics, Earth sciences and Engineering. The last 
line of Table 4 actually shows that, proportionally, Rome Tre contributes more to the 
formation of RSU faculty than the other two universities. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
 
5. RSU faculty performance 
 
In this section we compare research performance between the RSU and all other 
Italian universities. We begin with a comparison at the level of individual professors. 
Then aggregating the data by SDS, we compare performance at the level of SDSs, 
UDAs, and finally the overall universities. 
 
 
                                                          
14 An index value greater than one indicates that the incidence of faculty from the university 
considered is greater than expected given the total size of its faculty in that UDA. 
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5.1 RSU research performance at the individual level 
 
The performance ranking lists are expressed in percentiles and differentiated by 
academic rank, since we have demonstrated that productivity of full, associate and 
assistant professors is different (Abramo et al. 2011c). Thus the performance of each 
professor is calculated in each SDS for each academic rank and expressed on a scale of 
0-100 (worst to best) for comparison with the performance (PR) of all Italian colleagues 
of the same academic rank and SDS. 
Given the means of selection, we expect the bibliometric performance values for 
RSU faculty members to be very high: in this section we check these expectations. 
Table 5 shows the research performance of RSU professors by UDA, in terms of: i) 
average percentile of performance (PR); ii) percentage of those with performance rank 
above 80th national percentile; iii) percentage of those with performance rank above 90th 
percentile. For purposes of comparison, we present the same data for the three parent 
universities and the top universities in each of three national subgroups: public, Scuola 
Superiore and private universities. The top public university is close to the same size as 
the RSU in the disciplines considered, while the top private university and Scuola 
Superiore are very small even considering the entire faculty. The data show 
unmistakably high performance: the average percentile value for RSU faculty is 88.8, 
with a peak of 95.0 in Chemistry, followed by Engineering (92.9) and Physics (91.2). 
To have a further idea of the level of concentration of excellence achieved by the new 
RSU, we compare to the average values registered by the parent universities and top 
Italian universities. The overall average performance of the three parent university 
faculties varies between 40.9 for Sapienza and 48.8 for Tor Vergata, and the best 
showing for other Italian universities is 69.6. In the RSU, 84.2% of the total faculty 
show a performance superior to the 80th national percentile. In Chemistry, all professors 
selected for the RSU exceed the 80th national percentile and for Engineering the 
percentage is 91.3. Meanwhile, in the three parent universities the level of “top 20%” 
professors varies between 14.9% and 21.8% (Sapienza and Roma Tre). In the best 
public Italian university this figure is 36.5% and it is 54.5% in the top Scuola Superiore. 
If we raise the threshold to the 90th percentile, the absolute excellence of the RSU 
faculty is clear: 57.5% of the 247 professors selected show a PR that puts them above 
the 90% threshold in comparison with all other Italian colleagues in the same SDS and 
academic rank, with a peak of 77.89% in Chemistry. In contrast, in the three parent 
universities the share of professors with performances above the 90th percentile varies 
between 7.1% and 10.9%; the best Italian public university registers 22.8% and the best 
Scuola Superiore achieves 31.8%. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Table 6 shows detailed information concerning the distribution of performance 
values for the 247 selected professors: for 17 of these (6.9% of total) there are no Italian 
colleagues of the same SDS and academic rank with higher PR. In the three Rome 
parent universities, this situation occurs for only 0.8% of the total staff, and for Italian 
universities as a whole, this share is 1.1%. The concentration of top national professors 
in the RSU is thus eight times the average of the parent universities and more than six 
times the Italian average. Also, 9.7% of the selected professors register a performance 
value greater than or equal to the 99th national percentile, compared to just 1.3% of 
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professors in the parent university faculties and 1.6% of total Italian university faculty. 
Again, 38.1% of RSU professors, or seven times the average for Italian universities, 
place in the top 5% of professors in Italy. Only 15.8% of selected professors (39 out of 
247), classify under the 80th percentile. Finally, only 1.2% (3) professors show a PR 
value below the national median (last line of Table 6), compared to 50.4% of total 
faculty in the parent universities. 
 
[Table 6] 
 
 
5.2 RSU research performance at the SDS level 
 
We now analyze RSU performance at the scientific field level, meaning the SDS. A 
university SDS usually consists of professors of different academic ranks, with salaries 
dependent on their academic ranks and seniority. The impact of the SDS is given by the 
standardized citations for the publications of its member professors. Productivity PS is 
given by the overall impact divided by the number of professors, each weighted for their 
cost equivalent. The cost equivalent C shown in the last column of Table 7 is derived 
from MIUR15 data on the average yearly cost of professors in each academic rank. In 
formula: 
 
𝑃𝑆 =
∑ 𝑃𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 [2] 
 
where: 
PRi = productivity of the i-th professor in SDS 
Ci = cost equivalent of the i-th professor 
n = number of professors in SDS 
 
[Table 7] 
 
Calculating the productivity values as in [2] for all Italian universities active in the 
same SDS, we can then obtain the performance rank (absolute and percentile) for each 
of the RSU’s SDSs (Table 8). 
Of its 64 SDSs, there are 52 cases (81% of total) where the RSU’s bibliometric 
performance is above the 80th national percentile. Almost 72% of SDSs (46 of 64) show 
productivity performance that is equal to or greater than the 90th national percentile. 
There are 21 (33%) SDSs where the RSU would lead the national rankings and another 
eight (12.5%) where it would place second. There are only two SDSs (ING-INF/07 and 
ING-INF/06) where RSU performance is equal to or below the national median. 
 
[Table 8] 
 
 
5.3 RSU research performance at UDA level 
 
                                                          
15 https://dalia.cineca.it/php4/inizio_access_cnvsu.php. Last accessed on January 21, 2013 
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A UDA is formed of all professors belonging to its component SDSs. Performance 
evaluation for the UDA is conducted through standardization and weighting of the 
performance recorded at SDS level. Standardization to the national mean of the 
performance distribution for all universities active in the same SDS permits elimination 
of bias due to the different fertility of the SDSs; weighting with respect to the cost share 
of the SDS towards the total for the UDA takes into account the varying representativity 
of the SDSs in each UDA, in terms of faculty numbers and rank. This permits robust 
ratings in spite of the intrinsic heterogeneity of the SDSs (Abramo et al., 2008). 
Productivity (Pu) of a generic UDA is calculated: 
𝑃𝑢 = ∑
𝑃𝑖
𝑃?̅?
∙
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑢
𝑛𝑢
𝑖=1  [3] 
where: 
Pi = productivity of SDS i, 
𝑃?̅? = average value of productivity for Italian universities in SDS i 
Ci = cost equivalent of SDS i, 
Cu = cost equivalent of UDA u, 
nu = number of SDSs active in UDA u. 
 
We calculate the productivity values for each UDA at the RSU and for all Italian 
universities active in the same UDA. Results from the comparisons are shown in Table 
9. 
 
[Table 9] 
Where it doesn’t place first, the RSU is only outperformed by one or two of the tiny 
Scuole Superiori, however none of these has more than three professors in the UDAs 
examined. 
Extending the summation [3] to all SDSs at the RSU, we arrive at the calculation of 
the university’s overall productivity: the spin-off university achieves a performance 
value that would place it first in the national rankings among the 83 universities active 
in the hard sciences (Figure 1). The RSU’s performance would exceed the national 
median by 200%, and that of the top public institution by 75%. 
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Figure 1: Productivity distribution of Italian universities active in the hard sciences 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The challenges of global competition in research and higher education demand 
courageous and far-sighted policy choices. Some nations are already prepared to it 
because their systems have strong aspects of competition, particularly for resource 
allocation and in institutional autonomy. This has determined the development of 
significant differences in offerings and the emergence of elite universities that can 
attract highly-talented faculty and students on the international market, as well as 
abundant public and private financing, leading to notable socio-economic benefits in 
their territories. While still suffering from many broad approximations, international 
rankings do convey the undoubted existence of the phenomenon: the best respected 
rankings invariably report at least 18 universities from the UK and the USA among the 
top 20 positions. This is the result of the processes of selection that competitive systems 
have developed over the span of decades. Other countries show a much different 
situation: historic choices for greater levels of state regulation have in many cases 
resulted in the absence or insufficiency of incentive systems, and failed to encourage 
any qualitative differentiation in what universities offer. This has had important 
negative consequences in the areas of support to industrial competitiveness, and for the 
social and economic development of the nation itself. 
Particularly in Italy, differentiation among universities has been strongly opposed. In 
the name of equity and guarantees of equal opportunity for all, legislators designed and 
nurtured a system of research and higher education while they were unaware of the 
challenges that the globalized world held in store. The result is a pattern of highly 
concentrated distribution of research performance within the individual universities, 
similar to the pattern for national research population as whole. Accompanying this, the 
variability of performance among universities is less than the variability of performance 
for individual professors within each university. In synthesis, with the exception of the 
tiny Scuola Superiore advanced studies institutes, and a very few tiny private 
universities, Italy has no elite institutions, much less any world-class universities. No 
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international university ranking lists an Italian university above 150th place. The scarce 
qualitative differentiation in educational offerings and the absence of elite universities 
results in weaker impact on the competiveness of the productive system, hampers 
economic development, and has also clearly limited national occupational and economic 
mobility, which is among the lowest for wealthy countries. University degrees retain a 
legal value, such that without a degree it is impossible to work in a wide number of 
professions, or to participate in many job competitions in public administration. But this 
same system, administered together with the wide-spread favoritism16, actually hampers 
advancement of talented youth from the “less influential” classes, since they cannot 
obtain degrees from elite universities to demonstrate their capacities and value against 
equally titled but “backed” graduates. 
It is widely understood that in the knowledge-based economy, a strong higher 
education system translates into a decisive contribution to competitiveness of the 
national system, economic growth and social mobility. Given the current dramatic 
economic juncture, and emergence of global competition, we ask what can be done to 
make up the accumulated gap. To unlock the reform process, the most important driving 
force for modernizing higher education in Italy and similar countries could be a 
favorable regulatory framework that fosters competition. The reforms initiated by the 
Italian government in this sense are still very timid. Periodic national assessment 
exercises were introduced in 2006: the initiative is admirable, but these still show 
fundamental flaws that limit their effectiveness. First, the resources allocated to 
universities on the basis of results are still too low to stimulate competition and 
improvement; second, the resources are allocated in function of average merit of the 
universities and not to the individual professors. If the policy-maker’s intent is to 
optimize the socio-economic impact of public research financing through allocating 
more resources to universities with higher average efficiency, but the dispersion of 
performance within universities is still high (as in Italy), then there is the risk that the 
macroeconomic objective will never be met, unless the universities in turn carry out 
internal allocation of resources on performance principles. In fact, these principles are 
not followed in Italy, because: i) national assessment exercises do not measure 
individual performance; ii) the majority of professors (we recall that 77% of them 
produce only 23% of scientific advancement) are hostile to change in this direction. The 
risk of such failure is much less in systems with strong differentiation among 
universities, and where the variability of performance within institutions is much less 
than between them. In a context like Italy’s, it would be much more effective to provide 
individual evaluations and allocate resources directly to single researchers, as occurs in 
nations that primarily allocate their research funding on the basis of calls for proposals. 
A further and still more courageous step for Italy would be to link the professors’ actual 
salaries to the quality of their teaching and research. Similar incentives have recently 
been introduced in the public administration sector, but not yet in higher education, 
which is itself an indication of the reigning conservative forces. There is room for 
further and much needed initiatives, which would be greatly effective in stimulating 
greater competition and continuous improvement: liberation of resources cutting 
unproductive faculty (apparently about 25% of the total); abolition of the legal value of 
undergraduate degrees; and abolition of national public competitions for initial hiring 
and university career advancement. 
                                                          
16 In the 2011 World Democracy Audit for freedom from corruption, Italy ranked 51st out of 180 
countries. http://www.worldaudit.org/corruption.htm, last accessed on January 21, 2013. 
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The combination of Italy’s current financial crisis and the attitude of sacrifice that its 
citizens are called to support would seem to represent an ideal juncture for the current 
government to gain public legitimacy for undertaking the necessary structural reforms 
of the higher education system. However the authors are skeptical that the proper 
coincidence of conditions and will have arrived, or that if attempts were made, there 
would be results within acceptable times. Even if very substantial reforms are 
implemented, it would then take decades for the growth of elite universities that could 
stop the brain drain, and reverse it attracting foreign talent and resources. While we 
sincerely hope for the suggested reforms, we suggest an intervention that could proceed 
independently, and would still be complementary to any other measures taken: an 
intervention for the birth of spin-off universities, newly staffed by migration of only the 
top scientists from the existing universities and national research system. This 
intervention would be much less unpopular because it would not touch vested interests, 
and so would encounter less resistance to implementation. The asset of the proposal is 
its effectiveness in rapidly achieving what competitive systems have produced over the 
span of decades. The necessary policy should favor balanced regional distribution of 
such top universities and possibly their specialization based on the characteristics of 
their regions. Our simulation for the city of Rome has shown the higher quality level of 
such a spin-off university, budded from three existing ones, compared to all other Italian 
higher education institutions. This qualitative level could be raised still further by 
drawing faculty from other universities and research institutions in the area. The top 
universities thus created would by nature be highly resistant to the favoritism virus and 
much more inclined to adopt practical and principled strategies, typical of those in 
competitive systems. In the short term, the high qualitative level of faculty would be 
able to catalyze the other determinants of an elite university: highly talented students, 
abundant resources and visionary governance. The costs of such an operation are 
minimal, since a spin-off university could use the infrastructure of one of the parent 
universities, freed by the departure of the professors who lack qualifications towards the 
other parent universities. Given the socio-economic benefits, such an initiative would 
receive the support of all local stakeholders, including government, the productive 
system, and the local community. 
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UDA SDS* Faculty  UDA SDS* Faculty 
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INF/01 1  
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ICAR/01 5 
MAT/02 5  ICAR/02 5 
MAT/03 9  ICAR/03 1 
MAT/05 12  ICAR/04 4 
MAT/06 2  ICAR/05 4 
MAT/07 5  ICAR/07 2 
MAT/08 1  ICAR/08 4 
MAT/09 2  ICAR/09 2 
P
h
y
si
cs
 
FIS/01 14  ICAR/20 1 
FIS/02 7  ING-IND/04 2 
FIS/03 10  ING-IND/06 1 
FIS/04 3  ING-IND/08 5 
FIS/05 4  ING-IND/09 1 
FIS/06 3  ING-IND/11 3 
FIS/07 3  ING-IND/12 1 
C
h
em
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tr
y
 
CHIM/01 7  ING-IND/14 2 
CHIM/02 9  ING-IND/17 1 
CHIM/03 9  ING-IND/22 2 
CHIM/04 3  ING-IND/25 1 
CHIM/06 7  ING-IND/26 1 
CHIM/07 2  ING-IND/28 2 
CHIM/12 1  ING-IND/31 3 
SECS-P/13 1  ING-IND/32 3 
E
ar
th
 s
ci
en
ce
 
GEO/01 2  ING-IND/35 1 
GEO/02 2  ING-INF/01 9 
GEO/03 6  ING-INF/02 5 
GEO/04 1  ING-INF/03 6 
GEO/05 2  ING-INF/04 6 
GEO/06 3  ING-INF/05 14 
GEO/07 1  ING-INF/06 3 
GEO/08 6  ING-INF/07 2 
GEO/09 1  SECS-P/02 1 
Table 1: Distribution of RSU faculty by SDS and UDA 
* SDS codes are accessible at www.disp.uniroma2.it/laboratorioRTT/TESTI/Indicators/ssd1.htm 
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UDA Full professors Associate professors Assistant professors 
Mathematics 10 11 6 
Physics 18 16 8 
Earth science 6 8 9 
Chemistry 11 13 13 
Engineering 42 40 36 
Total 87 (35.2%) 88 (35.6%) 72 (29.1%) 
Total Italy 7175 (33.6%) 7155 (33.5%) 7013 (32.9%) 
Diff. +1.6% +2.1% -3.8% 
Table 2: Composition of RSU faculty per academic rank and UDA 
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UDA/Univ. Sapienza Tor Vergata Rome Tre RSU  
Mathematics 11 11 5 27 
Physics 25 7 10 42 
Earth science 14 - 9 23 
Chemistry 27 10 - 37 
Engineering 58 36 24 118 
Total 135 64 48 247 
Table 3: Parent universities for RSU faculty, by UDA 
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UDA/Univ “Sapienza” “Tor Vergata” “TRE” 
Mathematics 40.7% (0.90) 40.7% (1.02) 18.5% (1.27) 
Physics 59.5% (1.23) 16.7% (0.50) 23.8% (1.31) 
Earth science 60.9% (0.85) 0.0% (0.00) 39.1% (1.40) 
Chemistry 73.0% (1.00) 27.0% (0.99) 0.0% (0.00) 
Engineering 49.2% (0.85) 30.5% (1.06) 20.3% (1.50) 
Total 54.7% (0.96) 25.9% (0.89) 19.4% (1.39) 
Table 4: Contribution to RSU faculty from the three parent Rome universities (in parentheses the 
concentration with respect to total faculty) 
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School/University 
Average 
percentile rank 
Faculty above 
80th percentile 
Faculty above 
90th percentile 
Mathematics 88.9 89.2 59.5 
Physics 91.2 90.5 71.4 
Earth science 85.6 75.4 44.9 
Chemistry 95.0 100.0 77.8 
Engineering 92.9 91.3 69.6 
Total RSU 88.8 84.2 57.5 
Total “Sapienza” 40.9 14.9 7.1 
Total “Tor Vergata” 48.8 20.9 10.8 
Total “TRE” 47.2 21.8 10.9 
Top public university 60.7 36.5 22.8 
Top Scuola Superiore 68.7 54.5 31.8 
Top private university 69.6 44.2 29.9 
Table 5: Distribution of research performance for the RSU faculty and comparison with the three 
parent Rome universities and the top national universities 
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FSAc percentile  
RSU  
Average parent 
universities 
Average 
Italian universities 
=100 6.9% (17 of 247) 0.8% 1.1% 
≥99 9.7% (24 of 247) 1.3% 1.6% 
≥98 16.2% (40 of 247) 2.3% 2.4% 
≥95 38.1% (94 of 247) 5.5% 5.3% 
≥90 57.5% (142 of 247) 9.8% 11.9% 
≥80 84.2% (208 of 247) 19.4% 21.0% 
≥50 98.8% (244 of 247) 49.6% 47.8% 
Table 6: Distribution of research performance for RSU faculty, by percentile class, and comparison 
with the three Rome parent universities and all Italian universities 
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Academic rank Yearly average cost (k€) Equivalent cost 
Full professor (confirmed) 124.939 2.783 
Full professor (probationary) 94.442 2.103 
Associate professor (confirmed) 90.622 2.018 
Associate professor (probationary) 68.469 1.525 
Assistant professor (confirmed) 68.844 1.533 
Assistant professor (probationary) 44.899 1 
Table 7: Yearly cost of Italian professors, by academic rank (average values 2004-2008) 
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SDS UDA P* Rank Percent. SDS UDA P* Rank Percent. 
MAT/02 
M
at
h
em
at
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s 
0.39 2 out of 40 97.4 ICAR/01 
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 
0.11 8 out of 35 79.4 
MAT/03 0.39 1 out of 50 100 ICAR/02 0.15 9 out of 39 78.9 
MAT/05 1.11 1 out of 54 100 ICAR/03 0.21 4 out of 31 90 
MAT/06 0.57 4 out of 39 92.1 ICAR/04 0.15 1 out of 22 100 
MAT/07 1.12 1 out of 49 100 ICAR/05 0.06 6 out of 27 80.8 
MAT/08 0.58 4 out of 49 93.8 ICAR/07 0.06 5 out of 39 89.5 
MAT/09 0.36 9 out of 36 77.1 ICAR/08 0.78 1 out of 44 100 
INF/01 1.42 1 out of 52 100 ICAR/09 0.19 6 out of 42 87.8 
FIS/01 
P
h
y
si
cs
 
0.99 1 out of 54 100 ICAR/20 0.01 9 out of 18 52.9 
FIS/02 2.05 2 out of 39 97.4 ING-IND/04 0.17 2 out of 11 90 
FIS/03 2.13 1 out of 43 100 ING-IND/06 0.86 1 out of 18 100 
FIS/04 0.44 2 out of 32 96.8 ING-IND/08 0.38 2 out of 35 97.1 
FIS/05 1.52 2 out of 26 96 ING-IND/09 0.52 1 out of 29 100 
FIS/06 0.15 9 out of 24 65.2 ING-IND/11 0.20 2 out of 41 97.5 
FIS/07 0.67 1 out of 46 100 ING-IND/12 0.09 7 out of 21 70 
CHIM/01 
C
h
em
is
tr
y
 
1.52 1 out of 44 100 ING-IND/14 0.16 15 out of 36 60 
CHIM/02 1.58 3 out of 43 95.2 ING-IND/17 0.40 1 out of 33 100 
CHIM/03 0.93 5 out of 47 91.3 ING-IND/22 1.64 1 out of 40 100 
CHIM/04 0.43 6 out of 24 78.3 ING-IND/25 0.80 1 out of 28 100 
CHIM/06 0.99 2 out of 50 98.0 ING-IND/26 0.84 2 out of 16 93.3 
CHIM/07 1.28 3 out of 38 94.6 ING-IND/28 0.03 2 out of 7 83.3 
CHIM/12 0.55 2 out of 30 96.6 ING-IND/31 0.27 13 out of 37 66.7 
SECS-P/13 1.06 1 out of 17 100 ING-IND/32 0.10 9 out of 25 66.7 
GEO/01 
E
ar
th
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0.61 2 out of 31 96.7 ING-IND/35 0.20 3 out of 31 93.3 
GEO/02 0.17 7 out of 40 84.6 ING-INF/01 1.46 1 out of 43 100 
GEO/03 0.96 1 out of 32 100 ING-INF/02 1.07 2 out of 37 97.2 
GEO/04 0.13 7 out of 36 82.9 ING-INF/03 0.93 2 out of 42 97.6 
GEO/05 0.28 1 out of 41 100 ING-INF/04 0.83 3 out of 44 95.3 
GEO/06 0.51 2 out of 29 96.4 ING-INF/05 0.60 4 out of 59 94.8 
GEO/07 1.24 1 out of 32 100 ING-INF/06 0.18 12 out of 23 50 
GEO/08 0.50 3 out of 30 93.1 ING-INF/07 0.14 20 out of 36 45.7 
GEO/09 0.41 2 out of 29 96.4 SECS-P/02 1.20 1 out of 49 100 
Table 8: Absolute value and national rank (absolute and percentile) for productivity of the RSU SDSs 
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UDA PU rank percentile 
Mathematics 4.23 2 out of 65 98.4 
Physics 3.55 1 out of 62 100 
Chemistry 2.73 3 out of 60 96.6 
Earth science 3.31 1 out of 49 100 
Engineering 5.30 2 out of 69 98.5 
Table 9: Absolute value and national rank (absolute and percentile) of productivity for RSU UDAs 
